Cambridge University Press, 1st ed., 1973. X + 248 pp. D.j., 22 x 14cm. A little scuffing to f.e.p., (blank) with internal front flap of d.j., clipped & light wear to d.j., o/w V.G.+. Using Hitler’s attitude to Greece and Yugoslavia as a vital clue, this book puts forward a novel interpretation of Germany’s overall strategy in the years 1940-1. Placed within a more comprehensive framework, and rejecting traditional views, this reinterpretation constitutes a re-evaluation of the whole of Hitler’s strategy for the crucial period June 1940 – June 1941 – specifically of his relations with Italy, his attitude to the so-called ‘peripheral’ strategy, and his reasons for the attack on Greece. Further, the author throws new light on episodes that have hitherto been treated in isolation, such as the abortive German attempt to help their Italian allies in Albania. Based upon a wide range of unpublished primary sources, this book provides a fresh and provocative approach to German strategy in this crucial period.