1st ed., 1978. X + 598 pp., photo-plates + maps. D.j., 24 x 16cm. Nr.FINE. No armed force has ever presented the historian with such a tangle of truths, half-truths and myths to cope with when analysing the political and military events of the time, than has the German Army of Hitler’s Third Reich. Why, after so many startling successes, was the German Army beaten so completely ? In attempting to answer this the author has come to a number of novel conclusions concerning the political and military attitudes and actions of the Army and of its master, Adolf Hitler. He rejects any idea that Hitler was anything other than a total liability to the army he led; he shows that the usual interpretation of the relationship between the dictator and his generals, at any rate until 1938 is in need of considerable revision. Perhaps most important of all, he contends that Blitzkrieg is a myth : far from practising its hitherto-accepted concepts, the German Army deliberately pursued a form of war that directly contradicted the revolutionary principles of the ‘lightning-war’.