1st ed., 1972. Xi + 228 pp. D.j., 22 x 14cm. V.G.+. The author, a Wing Commander, well-known defence commentator and military economist, shows that Lord Trenchard lacked the mental stature to imbue the RAF with the correct military philosophy and the myths that grew up around him were to the detriment of British bombing policy. The failure of the RAF to pinpoint comparatively small targets in the early years of the Second World War forced the top brass to the fallacious conclusion that the burning of 70 of the largest cities in Germany would win the war for the Allies. This all-out assault on civilian morale was contrary to the beliefs of Churchill and Roosevelt who were in favour of destroying the Luftwaffe and its supporting factories, but the RAF defiantly made the cities their target. The Battle of Berlin in March 1944 proved how wrong they were but the RAF still went on to raze Hamburg and Dresden. This controversial book is the first to attempt a cost-effective evaluation of our strategic air offensive, which broadly failed in its war aims.