Bruce, George.


1st ed., 1979. 193 pp., maps. D.j., 22 x 14.5cm. Spine of d.j., faded o/w Nr.FINE. Were Churchill and the British Chiefs of Staff right in decisively rejecting the demands first of Stalin in 1941 and then, in 1942, of the Chief of Staff US Army, that Britain should launch an invasion of Hitler’s Fortress Europe to relieve the embattled Red Army ? Or were Britain’s two major allies trying to force actions upon her for quite different reasons ? Why did the influential press baron and Cabinet Minister Lord Beaverbrook side with the Russians and the American military leaders ? And how did it happen that America’s General Marshall and Admiral King raised the threat that their country would pull out of Britain and concentrate on defeating Japan unless the British launched an invasion of Europe in 1942 ? To find the answers the author has studied the then recently released documents of the debate of the War Cabinet and the Chiefs of Staff in their own words about this issue. Much is revealed about the characters and motives of the leaders of Britain, the US, and Russia. To complete the picture of the tortuous road to D-Day up to the morning of June 6 1944, the author documents the final selection of Normandy’s Baie de la Seine area and the planning and composition of the forces proposed for Operation Overlord.

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