(The Politics and Strategy of the Second World War). 1st ed., 1978. 250 pp., 17 maps. D.j., 22 x 14cm. FINE. This book examines numerous hypothetical questions about the D-Day landings and investigates the planning and strategic arguments on both sides of the Atlantic, as well as those that governed German military thinking on the likelihood, and projected defence, of an Allied invasion of Festung Europa. The author examines factors governing the debates, such as the need to aid the hard-pressed Soviet Union and the popular cry for a 'Second Front', and looks at the Allied campaign in detail. Part of the fascination of the whole story is the hypothetical questions which can be asked but which, because history can never be replayed, can never be fully answered: Would not Vienna have been a better strategic target than Paris? And would not the Mediterranean have provided an easier approach than the heavily fortified and defended English Channel coast ?